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BOOK REVIEWS
POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES. By Larry W. Yackle. The Lawyers Co-opera-
tive Publishing Co., Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1981. pp.xxi, 776. $47.50
Reviewed by Robert Popper*
Postconviction Remedies1 deals with a subject of great importance to
the practitioner of criminal law. It is concerned with the procedures avail-
able to persons who seek relief from their convictions after trial and after
direct review in the appellate courts. Though not usually a part of the law
school curriculum and therefore not part of the attorney's formal train-
ing, the intricacies of postconviction remedies must be mastered by the
lawyer who wishes to render skillfull service to the convicted client. The
trial and appeal are important battles, but others remain to be fought
which can decide crucial issues seriously affecting the final disposition of
the case.
The activity in the area of postconviction remedies is reflected in the
number of prisoners' petitions reaching the federal courts. Petitions filed
by state and federal prisoners accounted for 13.8 % of all civil litigation in
the United States district courts for the twelve months ending June 30,
1980.2 The records indicate a steady and significant increase in this litiga-
tion. Between 1960 and 1980, petitions from prisoners rose from 2,177 to
23,287, a difference of 969.7% . These figures do not reveal the whole
story, since they do not include the vast number of petitions from state
prisoners that were filed in state courts throughout the country.
Despite the obvious need for guidance so that lawyers, judges and pris-
oners may find their way through a complex maze of highly technical pro-
cedural requirements, there has been a paucity of comprehensive materi-
als on the subject.4 Professor Yackle's thoughtful exploration of the area
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law.
1. L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICrION REMEDIES (1981). The author is a professor of law at the
University of Alabama School of Law.
2. [1980] U.S. DISTR. CTS. ANN. REP. 60.
3. Id. at 62, table 20. This compares with an increase in all civil filings over the same
period of only 184.7%.
4. One of the more influential works, now outdated but still important, is Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1038 (1970). See also H.
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is welcome.
In his preface, the author refers to his volume as "a practical little
book." He is too modest and not entirely accurate. It has 776 pages; 600
of which are text; the rest is devoted to statutes, rules, a table of cases 5
and an index-not "little" by any standard. It is practical but not in the
how-to-do-it, continuing legal education sense. Although it is not tech-
nique oriented,' it is pragmatic because the knowledge it imparts is essen-
tial for making the necessary strategic decisions that govern postconvic-
tion remedies.
The approach of Professor Yackle is a scholarly one, which is appropri-
ate to his task. Postconviction remedies, while sounding crisp and settled,
are quite the opposite. It is an area that has undergone dramatic shifts in
recent years and is still in flux. The author recognizes this and spends a
good bit of effort pointing out and discussing the aspects of uncertainty
that exist. Attorneys engaged in postconviction counseling and litigation
will benefit from such discussion, which highlights the need for creative
lawyering and pinpoints those areas where there is room for advocacy to
influence the formation of the law.
The book is divided into nine chapters. The first chapter pertains to
state postconviction remedies for persons convicted in state courts. The
other chapters are concerned with federal postconviction remedies for
persons convicted in state or federal courts. Chapter One is perhaps the
least useful part of the book. It would not have been feasible to delve into
the subtleties of the remedies available in each of the states, Washington,
D.C. and Puerto Rico; therefore, except for California and New York, the
remedies in the various jurisdictions are discussed only generally with
emphasis on the historical development of habeas corpus and coram
nobis. Persons interested in the law of California and New York will find
this chapter particularly helpful. It will have very limited appeal to those
in other jurisdictions.
The main thrust of the book, and its chief value, is found in Chapters
Two through Nine. These deal primarily with the federal writ of habeas
corpus and with the related device available to federal prisoners for col-
HOFFMAN, PRISONERS' RIGHTS, TREATMENT OF PRISONERS AND POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES
(1976); R. POPPER, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES IN A NUTSHELL (1978).
5. The researcher might find one aspect of the table of cases annoying. Instead of refer-
ring the reader to the page in the text where the case is cited, the table gives a reference
only to the section where the case appears. Since sections can include many pages, the
reader is left to search through the many footnotes in the section in order to find the au-
thor's comments about the case.
6. See also M. HERMANN & M. HAFT, PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 255-328 (1973).
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laterally attacking their federal convictions.7 One portion which lawyers
familiar with criminal practice might find enlightening deals with the use
of civil rights actions brought by state prisoners in order to obtain tradi-
tional postconviction relief. s Professor Yackle's discussion relates to mat-
ters that are on the frontier of postconviction developments. Unfortu-
nately, it does not appear that the usual postconviction measures, such as
habeas corpus, will be replaced by a more modern, flexible action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Use of section 1983 can cause difficulties. For example,
the United States Supreme Court recently held that the doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel applies to section 1983 suits where the alleged grounds
for vacating the state court judgment were litigated at trial., This does
not explicitly answer whether section 1983 can be used to vacate a convic-
tion on grounds other than those actually litigated in the state trial. But
the author recognizes that the signals already emitted by the Court ap-
pear to give a negative answer to that question, making it risky to rely on
section 1983 as a substitute for a habeas attack on a judgment of
conviction. 0
Apart from the discussion of section 1983, Chapters Two through Nine
cover the main aspects, as well as the subtleties, of proceedings statuto-
rily provided for in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255. The topics explored include
the niceties of custody as a jurisdictional requirement, the exhaustion
doctrine, the law relating to procedural defaults, other procedural rules
and pitfalls, problems caused by successive applications, and issues cogni-
zable in collateral attack proceedings.
The two most recent significant developments in postconviction law
concern the availability of federal habeas corpus to raise fourth amend-
ment claims" and to raise points marred by the defendant's procedural
defaults before, during or after the trial.12 Professor Yackle's treatment of
these issues is excellent. He points out the ambiguities which are fruitful
grounds for further litigation. I would have been happier, however, if his
discussion of procedural default and decisions, such as Wainwright v.
Sykes, 3 had included a more careful analysis of what constitutes suffi-
cient "cause" to relieve the habeas petitioner of the procedural default
bar. He mentions ineffective assistance of counsel and related claims as
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
8. L. YACKLE, supra note 1, at 106-47.
9. Allen v. McCurry, 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980).
10. L. YACKLE, supra note 1, at 147-48.
11. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
12. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
13. 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (failure to timely object in accordance with state rule amounted to
independent and adequate state ground for decision).
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examples of cause,14 but he fails to probe further into this slippery un-
known in order to define with more precision the all-important "cause"
concept. For example, the innocent defendant who is the victim of a mis-
carriage of justice would seem to fit into the cause exception15 thereby
gaining access to federal habeas corpus. Also, where the default occurs in
relation to a procedural requirement that serves no legitimate state inter-
est, the Sykes bar would be eliminated since the independent and ade-
quate state ground rule would itself be avoided. 6 Other examples include:
the grisly choice & la Fay v. Noia17 which constitutes cause excusing the
procedural default, a retroactive change in the law which negates the de-
fendant's prior failure to make procedural objections,18 the mental incom-
petency of the defendant which prevents him from raising timely objec-
tion,19 and plain error. 0 A checklist and discussion of these and other
grounds for asserting "cause" would be an important and useful supple-
ment to the present edition.
21
There is another point of great practical importance which merits more
emphasis than given in the book. The prisoner seeking to vacate a state
conviction by invoking federal habeas corpus usually will have to rely on
federal constitutional grounds.22 Accordingly, lawyers who wish to take
advantage of federal habeas must use their ingenuity to fashion errors of
state law into a federal constitutional mold. A prime example of this oc-
14. L. YACKLE, supra note 1, at 346-50.
15. 433 U.S. at 91. See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250-66 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring); Canary v. Bland, 583 F.2d 887, 894-95 (6th Cir. 1978) (Merritt, J.,
concurring).
16. 433 U.S. at 83 n.8; id. at 107-08 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Grace v. Butterworth,
635 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1980); Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 445 U.S.
263 (1980).
17. 372 U.S. 391, 439-40 (1963).
18. Carter v. Jago, 637 F.2d 449, 454 (6th Cir. 1980); Graham v. Maryland, 454 F. Supp.
643, 648-49 (D. Md. 1978). Contra, Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 545 (1980).
19. Zapata v. Estelle, 588 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1979); Suggs v. LaVallee, 570 F.2d
1092, 1116-18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 915 (1978).
20. Compare 433 U.S. at 99 (White, J., concurring) and Berrier v. Egeler, 583 F.2d 515,
522 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978) with Hockenbury v. Sowders, 633 F.2d 443
(6th Cir. 1980).
21. In a news release of March 11, 1981, announcing the publication of the book, the
publisher states that Postconviction Remedies will be kept up to date through annual
supplementation.
22. Professor Yackle correctly identifies detainers as a means by which the prisoner can
gain federal habeas relief from a state conviction without relying on federal constitutional
grounds. L. YACKLE, supra note 1, at 361 n.16. See, e.g., Cody v. Morris, 623 F.2d 101 (9th
Cir. 1980).
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curred in Jackson v. Virginia,2" which the author cites in a slightly differ-
ent context.24 The Court in Jackson "federalized" the right to have a con-
viction based upon legally sufficient evidence. Prior to Jackson, an error
of insufficient evidence generally was considered to raise a question of
state law.25 Other recent examples of federal constitutional issues include
the impropriety of allowing into evidence the accused's prior convic-
tions,21 denying a defense request for a continuance in order to obtain a
crucial witness,27 and failure to instruct on the defense of self-defense.28
The point is an important one. The attorney must remain alert to the
possibility of phrasing state trial error so as to assert federal constitu-
tional grounds.
Professor Yackle did not discuss exegutive clemency, a significant non-
judicial remedy. It is a topic which, though important, is sufficiently
offbeat to escape the attention of many lawyers and deserves some
attention.
Postconviction Remedies is a book that will be valuable to the lawyer
engaged in the prosecution or defense of criminal cases. It is well docu-
mented, easy to read, and, in its thoughtful way, practical. The practi-
tioner who is familiar with the subject will benefit from new insights of-
fered by the author. The newcomer to postconviction remedies will find
the work rewarding in many ways. The law it discusses is exciting. The
great writ of habeas corpus has proved to be indispensable in preserving
our liberties. How it should operate-expansively or restrictively-is an
issue which has provoked emotional debates over the judiciary's role in
the administration of justice. The feelings that can arise in postconviction
cases are reflected in a dissent to a decision which continued a trend ex-
panding the habeas court's jurisdiction by applying a liberal definition of
the custody requirement. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justice Powell, wrote in ire: "The Court apparently feels, like
Faust, that it has in its previous decisions already made its bargain with
the devil, and it does not shy from this final step in the rewriting of the
23. 443 U.S.'307 (1979).
24. L. YACKLE, supra note 1, at 416.
25. An exception to the general rule that insufficient evidence raises only a question of
state law occurs when the evidence is so insufficient that the record is wholly devoid of
evidence relating to a crucial element of the offense charged. Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414
U.S. 478 (1974); Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
26. Bryson v. Alabama, 634 F.2d 862, 865 (5th Cir. 1981).
27. Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981).
28. United States ex rel. Means v. Solem, 480 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.S.D. 1979), afl'd, 646
F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1980).
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statute."2 9 Professor Yackle has managed to capture that excitement. His
book deserves a place on the criminal law practitioner's bookshelf.
29. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 355 (1973).
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FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER.
By Martin H. Redish. The Michie Company, Charlottesville, Va. 1981.
pp.xiii, 361, $25.00
Reviewed by William B. deMeza, Jr.*
The apparent liberal-to-conservative shift in this nation's dominant po-
litical philosophy during the past several years may not be the most dra-
matic in our history. It will nonetheless have long-range consequences for
the federal courts. First, the composite philosophy of the federal judiciary
will undoubtedly change as the new presidential incumbents exercise
their appointive prerogative to fill vacancies on the bench. This is hardly
surprising. Americans have long resigned themselves to the fact that the
shifting sands of political fortune are reflected in the pools of candidates
for life-tenure federal appointment. The second consequence is, perhaps,
of more significance, though no more surprising after ideological upheav-
als. Ambitious legislative efforts to change the nature of cases to be heard
in the federal courts have been spawned by the rise of conservatism. Spe-
cial-interest groups have prompted congressional proposals to restrict,
sometimes radically, the jurisdiction of both the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts.
There have been prior attempts to limit federal intervention by adjust-
ing jurisdiction over matters "traditionally left to the states."' The sheer
number, varied subjects, and potential effects of the current legislation
may be unprecedented. The bills would abolish diversity jurisdiction,2
modify the Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction,3 and divest the Su-
preme Court or lower federal courts of jurisdiction to hear abortion4 and
school prayer cases. 5 These legislative measures have greater probability
* B.S., 1970, Case Western Reserve University;, J.D., 1980, University of Toledo. The au-
thor is an associate in the Bradenton, Florida office of Holland & Knight.
1. See, e.g., S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (sections of the Omnibus Crime and Safe
Streets Act eliminating federal jurisdiction to review the voluntary nature of confessions
offered in state court criminal proceedings); S. 2646, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (the Jenner
bill, eliminating Supreme Court jurisdiction to review a variety of federal, state, and local
laws and proceedings related to subversive activities).
2. H.R. 2404, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The immediate predecessor of this bill, H.R.
9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), passed the House but died in the Senate at adjournment
for lack of action.
3. H.R. 2406, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
4. S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
5. S. 481, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). These "special interest" bills have met with strong
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of passage than their predecessors, for the bills are not only sponsored by
well-financed, vocal groups but also have received encouragement from
the executive branch.
Further restructuring of federal-state and inter-branch relationships
also may be anticipated in light of forthcoming appointments to the Su-
preme Court. Although it would be naive to expect that the new Justices
will faithfully mirror the President's personal philosophy, they will proba-
bly reflect the conservative nature of his constituency. New appointees
may assist a growing minority on the Court in further limiting the growth
of the federal government's authority.
Several recent decisions suggest that the Supreme Court is ripe for
change. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Company' may be indicative
of the Court's mood. Although the decision involved a relatively routine
application of the equal protection7 and commerce 8 clauses of the Consti-
tution, it sparked a heated colloquy between Justices Brennan and Ste-
vens concerning the deference to be accorded legislative facts as found by
a state's highest court. Cuyler v. Adams,9 which held that the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers must be interpreted as a matter of federal law,
prompted a dissenter's charge of unwarranted, unprincipled, and un-
wanted extension of federal authority into purely interstate matters."0
Sumner v. Mata,1 ' another recent opinion, suggested increasing solici-
tousness of state criminal verdicts. Sumner required federal habeas
courts to specify the basis for reversing state court findings of fact even
when that issue was not raised in a timely manner in the court below.
2
Critics have long called for major modifications in the jurisdiction of
the federal courts and in the federal government's intrusion into state
issues through its laws, agencies, or judiciary. For example, the Chief Jus-
tice has frequently advocated the elimination of federal diversity as well
as the severe restriction of the Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction."3
criticism from the legal "establishment." See Editorial, Attack on Courts, 67 A.B.A.J. 812
(1981). The American Bar Association apparently opposes the abolition of diversity and
divestiture of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review the "special interest" topics, sup-
ports the limitation of the Court's mandatory jurisdiction, and has not taken a position on
review of the special-interest topics by the lower federal courts. 67 A.B.A.J. 704 (1981).
6. 101 S. Ct. 715 (1981).
7. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. 101 S. Ct. 703 (1981).
10. Id. at 713-15.
11. 101 S. Ct. 764 (1981).
12. Id. at 769-72.
13. See, e.g., Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary 1979, 65 A.B.A.J. 358, 362
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Scholarly legal journals are filled with articles suggesting that federal ju-
risdiction be widened or narrowed or widened and narrowed, with discus-
sions of the perplexing effects of those changes.14
Tensions 5 is a particularly timely publication in light of this ferment
in federal-state and legislative-judicial relationships. The author identi-
fies and discusses those areas of federal jurisdiction in which he believes
the tensions are most acute. Each of the twelve chapters focuses on a
separate area of potential conflict: between the federal and state courts;
the federal courts and state political entities; the state courts and federal
political entities; and the Article III courts and other branches of the fed-
eral government. Redish is not content with merely reiterating the cur-
rent state of the law. Instead, he presents "applications of the unified
approach to the issues of judicial federalism . . [in] an attempt to reor-
ganize the values and priorities underlying the allocation of judicial
power."16
In these days of states' rights and highly-financed special-interest
groups, the premise of the book may seem somewhat anachronistic.
The premise ... is that the integrity of the Article III federal courts as the
primary adjudicators of federal law must be preserved. The federal courts
stand as the fundamental protectors of both federal rights and federal gov-
ernmental interests. An individual should therefore be presumed to be able
to obtain judicial vindication of his federal rights in federal, rather than
state court. This presumption should be overcome only when Congress has
made clear its contrary intent, or the consequence of providing such an op-
portunity would be severe disruption of a compelling state interest.17
While Redish persuasively argues for his premise that the states, state
courts, and the non-Article III federal judiciary are not to be trusted as
the final guarantors of individual rights, Tensions may be most suscepti-
ble to criticism for this very premise.
The growth of federal "interventionism" in all its forms during the past
125 years has been prompted in part by the well-founded belief, that the
states and their courts were often unwilling or unable to acknowledge and
(1979).
14. See, e.g., Champlin, Extension of Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction: The Need for
a Functional Approach, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1437 (1980); Berger, Congressional Contraction
of Federal Jurisdiction, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 801; Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie
After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1980).
15. M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER
(1980).
16. Id. at 1.
17. Id. at 1-2.
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enforce large parts of our Constitution. That those federal intrusions were
necessary and appropriate responses to those times and those circum-
stances can hardly be disputed. The author recognizes that legislative and
attitudinal changes in the last three decades may have removed the pre-
conditions for continuing to designate the federal courts as the sole final
guardians of individual rights. While noting that many states have ex-
tended their protection of individual rights in theory and practice beyond
those enumerated by or implied under the federal Constitution,18 Profes-
sor Redish does not properly reconcile this fact with his deeply-felt mis-
trust of the states and their judiciary. Professor Redish obviously lacks
the jurisprudential optimism recently expressed by Justice Rehnquist:
State judges as well as federal judges swear allegiance to the Constitution of
the United States, and there is no reason to think that because of their
frequent differences of opinions as to how that document should be inter-
preted that all are not doing their mortal best to discharge their oath of
office.19
Although one may criticize the author's hypothesis, it is difficult to crit-
icize the substance of what he has accomplished: a coherent, cogent, one-
volume presentation of a subject whose complexity has earned it the un-
derstandable aversion of many a law student. Tensions is a welcome addi-
tion to the literature. It is difficult to characterize the work as casebook,
treatise or commentary-normally the formats of the standard federal ju-
risdiction references. Such formats are either all-encompassing and aca-
demic,20 strongly oriented to the federal practitioner, 21 or thoughtful ju-
risprudential commentaries. 22 Each has its own particular appeal and
application. Tensions seems to combine their features in a readable fash-
ion most useful to the academician or frequent federal or appellate
18. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
19. 101 S. Ct. at 770. Federal habeas corpus review of state convictions has become a
fertile source of federal-state friction, especially after Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 416 (1963),
which held that habeas was "almost in the nature of removal from the state to the federal
courts of prisoners' constitutional contentions."
20. See, e.g., P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973); ALl STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969).
21. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (3d ed. 1976).
22. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973). It is interest-
ing to note the recent reissue of several older works in the field, which prove informative for
their historical perspective on the current debates. See R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS
(1979) (originally published in 1940); G. HOLT, THE CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF THE FED-




Tensions' greatest strength may lie in its ability to stimulate the
reader's thinking. Redish's fresh approach to seemingly settled areas of
the law, accompanied by an unwavering commitment to his major pre-
mise, makes for an interesting book. Unfortunately, the book went to
press before a number of intriguing opinions were handed down by the
Supreme Court; consequently no consideration is given to the Court's
strict interpretation of the federal habeas statute,24 extensive inclusion of
uniform acts within the federal law,25 and exposure of state judiciary to
civil penalties.
26
The book is logically organized, thoroughly substantiated and precisely
written. Redish accurately summarizes opinions and is careful to deline-
ate his objective analyses of precedent from his thought-provoking opin-
ions. Perhaps the volume's only "mechanical" deficiency is in the index,
which is too incomplete to allow rapid reference to a specific, less signifi-
cant topic.
Tensions may not be suitable for classroom use as a primary
sourcebook, for it analyzes and disposes of even major precedent in sev-
eral short paragraphs. Since it is of manageable length and reads well,
Tensions may be suitable for a one-semester federal jurisdiction course.
However, students should also be assigned a more detailed, supplemental
exploration of specific key cases.
Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power by
Martin Redish will undoubtedly become a widely used reference in many
libraries. Many readers may disagree with Professor Redish's belief that
the Article III courts are the only trustworthy institutional guardians of
our Constitution, and may be put off by his frank mistrust of the states,
state courts, and non-Article III federal judiciary. Tensions transcends
philosophical differences, however, for it is a well-organized study of a
complex topic which provides concise summaries of the law as it exists,
followed by the author's thoughtful reflections on the law as it should be
or may become. This excellent study should be read by every federal
judge, clerk, and practitioner.
23. Tensions has a facial similarity to a treatise on constitutional law by Professor Tribe.
See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1979). Both works dissect the subject accord-
ing to a scheme developed by the author and attempt a comprehensive yet unified analysis.
Both authors speak distinctly and with authority.
24. 101 S. Ct. 764 (1981).
25. 101 S. Ct. 703 (1981).
26. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S.
719 (1980).
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